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I. Introduction 
In 2008, the United States financial system was brought to its 
knees, and many now regard the 2008 financial crisis as one of the 
worst, if not the worst, financial and economic crises in global 
history.1 In September of that year, the federal government, in an 
attempt to stabilize the U.S. housing market, seized control of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.2 At the time, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac owned or guaranteed approximately half of the 
nation’s twelve trillion dollar mortgage market,3 and—according 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since ‘30s, With No End Yet in 
Sight, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB122169431617549947?mg=id-wsj (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (“‘This has been 
the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. There is no question about 
it,’ said Mark Gertler, a New York University economist . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Matt Egan, 2008: Worse than the Great 
Depression?, CNN MONEY (Aug. 27, 2014, 5:34 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/08/27/news/economy/ben-bernanke-great-depression/ 
index.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (“Ben Bernanke, the former head of the 
Federal Reserve, said the 2008 financial crisis was the worst in global history, 
surpassing even the Great Depression.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 2. See Reuters, Government Takes Control of Fannie, Freddie, CNBC (Aug. 
5, 2010, 1:24 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/26590793/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) 
(“The Government on Sunday seized control of mortgage finance companies 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, launching what could be its biggest federal bailout 
ever, in a bid to support the U.S. housing market and ward off more global 
financial market turbulence.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See Charles Duhigg, Loan-Agency Woes Swell from a Trickle to a Torrent, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/11/business/11 
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to then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson—“a failure of either of 
them would cause great turmoil in our financial markets here at 
home and around the globe.”4 In addition, Lehman Brothers, one 
of the largest and most prestigious financial firms in the world, 
filed for bankruptcy protection.5 Further, financial services and 
wealth management giant Merrill Lynch agreed to sell itself to 
Bank of America for a fraction of its overall value.6 As if these 
events were not enough to indicate an economic throttling, the U.S. 
government agreed to bail out insurance mammoth AIG at a price 
tag of $85 billion.7 Ultimately, the economic tailspin prompted the 
government to enact the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008,8 a $700 billion bailout of the financial services industry.9 
                                                                                                     
ripple.html?ex=1373515200&en=8ad220403fcfdf6e&ei=5124&partner=permalin
k&exprod=permalink (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
are so big—they own or guarantee roughly half of the nation’s $12 trillion 
mortgage market—that the thought that they might falter once seemed 
unimaginable.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4.  Reuters, supra note 2. 
 5.  See Graeme Weardon et al., Banking Crisis: Lehman Brothers Files for 
Bankruptcy Protection, GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2008, 7:45 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/sep/15/lehmanbrothers.creditcrunc
h (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (“Lehman Brothers, one of the most prestigious 
players on Wall Street, filed for bankruptcy protection this morning after a 
frenzied weekend of negotiations failed to find a way of saving the company.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6.  See Matthew Karnitschnig et al., Bank of America to Buy Merrill, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 
122142278543033525 (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (“The deal shows how the credit 
crisis has created opportunities for financially sound buyers. At $50 billion, 
Merrill is being sold at about two-thirds of its value of one year ago and half its 
all-time peak value of early 2007.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 7.  See Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion 
Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 
2008, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122156561931242905 (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2017) (“The U.S. government seized control of American 
International Group Inc.—one of the world’s biggest insurers—in an $85 billion 
deal that signaled the intensity of its concerns about the danger a collapse could 
pose to the financial system.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). 
 9. See M. Alex Johnson, Bush Signs $700 Billion Bailout Bill, NBC NEWS 
(Oct. 3, 2008, 4:33 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26987291/ns/business-
stocks_and_economy/t/bush-signs-billion-financial-bailout-
bill/#.WAAcpoWcGM8 (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (“President Bush signed into law 
Friday a historic $700 billion bailout of the financial services industry, promising 
to move swiftly to use his sweeping new authority to unlock frozen credit markets 
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With a purpose “[t]o promote the financial stability of the 
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the 
financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from 
abusive financial services practices,” Congress enacted the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–
Frank).10 Dodd–Frank amended the Securities Exchange Act of 
193411 (Exchange Act) to include certain whistleblower protections 
against employer retaliation under subsection 21F.12 Among these 
protections are prohibitions against discharge, demotion, 
suspension, harassment, threatening, and discrimination against 
whistleblowers.13 For the purposes of Dodd–Frank, Congress 
unambiguously and expressly defined a “whistleblower” as “any 
individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly 
who provide, information relating to a violation of the securities 
laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or 
regulation, by the Commission.”14 The meaning of “Commission” is 
equally unambiguous under Dodd–Frank; it is defined as “the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.”15 Thus, it is necessary for 
a person or persons to report misconduct to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to receive whistleblower status and 
protections under Dodd–Frank. 
This Note addresses a circuit court split arising from a portion 
of the anti-retaliation provisions. Subsection 21F’s retaliation 
prohibitions apply to those employers whose employees make 
required or protected disclosures under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
200216 (SOX) or any other rule or regulation under the SEC’s 
jurisdiction.17 SOX provides anti-retaliation protections—similar 
                                                                                                     
to get the economy moving again.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 10.  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  
 11.  15 U.S.C.  § 78a–qq (2012). 
 12.  Pub. L. No. 111-203,  § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6). 
 13. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012) (prohibiting various forms of 
retaliatory conduct against whistleblowers under the Dodd–Frank Act). 
 14.  Id. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
 15.  Pub. L. No. 111-203,  § 2(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1387 (2010). 
 16.  Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 17. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2012)  
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to those available under Dodd–Frank—for employees of publicly 
traded companies who report misconduct.18 However, SOX 
expressly affords protections to those who provide information to 
“a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; any Member of 
Congress or any committee of Congress; or a person with 
supervisory authority over the employee (or such other person 
working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, 
discover, or terminate misconduct).”19 Thus, while Dodd–Frank’s 
protections, by the Act’s express terms, only apply to those who 
report to the SEC, SOX grants protections to those who report to a 
much broader array of persons and organizations. Some believe 
that subsection 21F’s reference to SOX indicates that the definition 
of “whistleblower” under Dodd–Frank is much broader and more 
inclusive than its express definition would otherwise suggest.20 
The SEC, in an effort to provide some guidance on subsection 
21F, promulgated an interpretive rule to clarify the meaning of 
“whistleblower” under Dodd–Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions. 
The interpretive rule states that, “[f]or purposes of the 
anti-retaliation protections afforded by Section 21F(h)(1) of the 
Exchange Act, you are a whistleblower if . . . you provide that 
information in a manner described in Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the 
Exchange Act.”21 This rule, if the courts validate it, would 
effectively change the meaning of “whistleblower” under 
subsection 21F of the Exchange Act. As stated above, the term’s 
express definition only includes those who report “to the 
Commission.”22 The SEC’s interpretive rule, however, places no 
                                                                                                     
No employer may . . . discriminate against, a whistleblower in the 
terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by 
the whistleblower . . . in making disclosures that are required or 
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . and any other law, 
rule, or regulation subject to [the SEC’s jurisdiction]. 
 18. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012) (prohibiting publicly traded companies, 
and officers and agents thereof, from discharging, demoting, or otherwise 
harassing employees of said companies on account of their whistleblower status). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(concluding that the provisions of subsection 21F should be interpreted to 
incorporate and protect those who make SOX disclosures but who have not 
reported to the SEC). 
 21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(ii) (2016). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012). 
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such limitation on the term and, indeed, expands the statutory 
definition.23 
Recently, three circuit courts of appeals have split on whether 
or not to grant deference to the SEC’s interpretive rule. In 2013, 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the definition of 
“whistleblower” provided by subsection 21F is unambiguous, and 
that the SEC’s interpretive rule should not receive deference.24 
Two years later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found the 
opposite, finding that subsection (h) of 21F, in conjunction with 
subsection (a), engenders sufficient statutory ambiguity to grant 
deference to the SEC’s interpretation.25 Both courts utilized the 
analysis set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
                                                                                                     
 23. Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act—referenced by the SEC’s 
interpretive rule—describes three reporting methods by which the retaliation 
prohibitions are triggered. First, a person may provide information to the 
Commission. See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i) (prohibiting employer retaliation against 
employees who report to the SEC). Second, a person may initiate, testify in, or 
assist in an investigation or judicial or administrative action of the SEC based on 
information that person has provided. See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(ii) (prohibiting 
employer retaliation against those who assist in certain proceedings against the 
employer). Finally, a person may make disclosures which are required or 
protected by certain other laws, rules, and regulations. See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) 
(prohibiting employer retaliation against those who “mak[e] disclosures that are 
required or protected under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, this chapter, 
including section 78j-1(m) of this title, section 1513(e) of Title 18, and any other 
law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission”). The SEC 
regulation would change the meaning of “whistleblower” from including only 
those who report to the SEC to include anyone who acts in any of these 
aforementioned ways. 
 24. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 626–27 (5th Cir. 
2013) (“[The] definition, standing alone, expressly and unambiguously requires 
that an individual provide information to the SEC to qualify as a ‘whistleblower’ 
for purposes of  § 78u–6.”). 
 25. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he 
tension between the definition in subsection 21F(a)(6) and the limited protection 
provided by subdivision (iii) of subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) if it is subject to that 
definition renders section 21F as a whole sufficiently ambiguous to oblige us to 
give Chevron deference to the reasonable interpretation of the [SEC].”). 
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Defense Council, Inc.,26 but arrived at different results.27 The 
Ninth Circuit weighed in on March 8, 2017, concluding that 
subsection 21F unambiguously affords Dodd–Frank protections to 
those who do not report to the SEC.28  
This Note resolves the circuit split described above by arguing 
in favor of the Fifth Circuit’s non-deferential approach. Part II 
examines subsection 21F and its role in the context of the 
overarching scheme of securities laws.29  Part III examines the 
circuit split arising out of the SEC’s interpretive rule.  It will 
discuss the Chevron analysis in-depth and will explore the 
development of the circuit split since the Fifth and Second Circuit 
decisions, paying attention to federal district courts that have 
since weighed in on the issue and briefly discussing the Ninth 
Circuit’s recent opinion.30 Part IV proposes the legal solution to the 
split and explore the policy considerations in favor of and against 
that solution, and then will propose a legislative path forward.31 
Ultimately, this Note argues that no ambiguity exists with respect 
to subsection 21F’s definition of whistleblower, that the Fifth 
                                                                                                     
 26. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Court articulated the two-part framework in 
the following way: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, then 
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute . . . . Rather . . . the question for the court 
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute. 
Id. at 842–43. 
 27. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626–27 (finding no statutory ambiguity in 
subsection 21F of the Exchange Act, and thus finding that the SEC’s interpretive 
rule should be afforded no Chevron deference); see also Berman, 801 F.3d at 147 
(finding that subsection (a)’s definition of “whistleblower” and subsection (h)’s 
reference to SOX foster a statutory ambiguity, and finding that the SEC’s 
interpretive rule is a permissible reading of subsection 21F). 
 28. See Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(“[Dodd–Frank]’s anti-retaliation provision unambiguously and expressly 
protects from retaliation all those who report to the SEC and who report 
internally.”). 
 29. Infra Part II. 
 30. Infra Part III. 
 31. Infra Part IV. 
520 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 513 (2018) 
Circuit Court of Appeals arrived at the proper legal conclusion, and 
that the courts should not grant deference to the SEC’s 
interpretive ruling. This Note also posits that the scheme of the 
federal securities laws heavily incentivizes reporting misconduct 
to the SEC, and that Congress should amend SOX to make its 
anti-retaliation provisions more appealing and available. 
II. Subsection 21F in the Scheme of Securities Laws 
A. The Language of Subsection 21F 
Subsection 21F defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual 
who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, 
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the 
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the 
Commission.”32 Subsection 21F provides certain protections for 
these whistleblowers under subsection (h), entitled “Protection of 
Whistleblowers.”33 That section states that: 
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, 
directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate 
against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of 
employment because of any lawful act done by the 
whistleblower (i) in providing information to the Commission in 
accordance with this section; (ii) in initiating, testifying in, or 
assisting in any investigation or judicial or administrative 
action of the Commission based upon or related to such 
information; or (iii) in making disclosures that are required or 
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 
et seq.), this chapter, including section 78j-1(m) of this title, 
section 1513(e) of Title 18, and any other law, rule, or regulation 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.34 
Taken together, the statute’s definition of “whistleblower” and 
subsection (h)’s focus on protections for whistleblowers seem to 
stand for the proposition that the protections afforded by 
subsection (h) only attach to those who have reported misconduct 
to the SEC. 
                                                                                                     
 32. 15 U.S.C.  § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012). 
 33. Id.  § 78u-6(h). 
 34. Id.  § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
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Dodd–Frank also provides a private cause of action for 
employees whose employers injure them through retaliatory 
action.35 Three remedies become available if a plaintiff succeeds in 
his or her private action against the employer for violation of 
subsection 21F’s anti-retaliation provisions.36 These remedies 
include reinstatement of the whistleblower’s employment with the 
company,37 double any back pay owed to the wrongfully terminated 
employee,38 and litigation costs.39 The conditions necessary to 
trigger anti-retaliation provisions under Dodd–Frank differ from 
those needed to trigger similar provisions under SOX, and—as this 
Note observes below—the potential relief for violations of those 
provisions also differ between Dodd–Frank and SOX.40 
B. Anti-Retaliation Protections Under Sarbanes–Oxley 
Section 1514A of SOX prohibits publicly traded companies, or 
officers, managers, and agents of publicly traded companies, from 
taking retaliatory action against an employee for reporting his or 
her employer’s misconduct.41 Further, this section prohibits 
retaliation when the employee provides information to “a Federal 
regulatory or law enforcement agency; any Member of Congress or 
                                                                                                     
 35. See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (“An individual who alleges discharge or other 
discrimination in violation of subparagraph (A) may bring an action under this 
subsection in the appropriate district court of the United States for the relief 
provided in subparagraph (C).”). 
 36. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C). 
 37. See id.  § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(i) (stating that relief for a successful plaintiff 
shall include “reinstatement with the same seniority status that the individual 
would have had, but for the discrimination”). 
 38. See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii) (stating that relief for a successful plaintiff 
shall include “[two] times the amount of back pay otherwise owed to the 
individual, with interest”). 
 39. See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(iii) (stating that relief for a successful plaintiff 
shall include “compensation for litigation costs, expert witness fees, and 
reasonable attorneys’ fees”). 
 40. See infra Part II.C (outlining various distinctions between SOX and 
Dodd–Frank provisions). 
 41. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012) (“No company with a class of securities 
registered under [the Exchange Act] . . . may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the 
terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the 
employee [to report misconduct].”). 
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any committee of Congress; or a person with supervisory authority 
over the employee (or such other person working for the employer 
who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate 
misconduct).”42 Additionally, the retaliation prohibitions under 
SOX operate when an employee of a publicly traded company 
assists with a proceeding related to certain criminal violations.43  
Once the retaliation protections attach under one of these 
broad provisions, Section 1514A—like subsection 21F of Dodd–
Frank—allows for a private cause of action against an employer.44 
However, the would-be plaintiff must first file a complaint with the 
Secretary of Labor.45 If the Secretary of Labor does not issue a final 
decision on the matter within 180 days after the employee files the 
complaint, and the delay is not caused by a bad faith effort, the 
claimant may then bring suit directly against their employer.46 A 
successful claimant under the above-described procedure becomes 
eligible for three potential remedies, which the statute deems 
“necessary to make the employee whole.”47 These remedies include 
reinstatement of the wrongfully terminated employee,48 payment 
of back pay owed to the employee,49 and “special damages.”50 
                                                                                                     
 42. Id. § 1514A(a)(1). 
 43. See id. § 1514A(a)(2) (prohibiting retaliation against employees who “file, 
cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a 
proceeding . . . relating to an alleged violation of . . . any rule or regulation of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to 
fraud against shareholders”). 
 44. See id. § 1514A(b) (“A person who alleges discharge or other 
discrimination by any person in violation of subsection (a) may seek relief under 
subsection (c) . . . .”). 
 45. Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(a). 
 46. See id. § 1514A(b)(1)(b) (“[I]f the Secretary has not issued a final decision 
within 180 days . . . and there is no showing that such delay is due to the bad faith 
of the claimant, [the claimant may bring an action] for de novo review in [a federal 
district court] . . . .”). 
 47. Id. § 1514A(c)(1). 
 48. See id. § 1514A(c)(2)(i) (stating that relief shall include “reinstatement 
with the same seniority status that the employee would have had, but for the 
discrimination”). 
 49. See id.  § 1514A(c)(2)(ii) (stating that relief shall include “the amount of 
back pay, with interest”). 
 50. See id. § 1514A(c)(2)(iii) (stating that relief shall include “compensation 
for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including 
litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees”). 
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C. The Structure of Dodd–Frank’s and SOX’s Anti-Retaliation 
Protections Vary Significantly 
The statutory language outlined above reveals some stark 
differences between the anti-retaliation regimes under Dodd–
Frank and SOX. First, under the plain language of subsection 21F, 
Dodd–Frank’s prohibition against employer retaliation only 
applies in the event an informant provides information to the 
SEC.51 SOX’s requirements are not so restrictive. SOX grants 
protections in the event an informant-employee reports to one of 
myriad authorities52 or assists in an investigation.53 The 
protections and remedies under SOX are more widely available 
than their Dodd–Frank counterparts by virtue of the fact that SOX 
does not limit its protections in the way that Dodd–Frank does. 
Informants under SOX may report to virtually anyone with an 
interest in the information they are willing to provide and enjoy 
the benefits of retaliation protection.54 Under Dodd–Frank, by 
contrast, similar protections are only available to those who report 
“to the Commission.”55 
Second, there are procedural hurdles to the private cause of 
action under SOX that are not required for a private party to bring 
suit under Dodd–Frank. As stated above, a claimant under SOX 
must first file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.56 The 
                                                                                                     
 51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012) (“The term ‘whistleblower’ means any 
individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, 
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a 
manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”); see also id.  
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (“No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, 
harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a 
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment . . . .”). 
 52. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (stating that protections are available for 
those who report misconduct to “a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; 
any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or a person with 
supervisory authority over the employee”). 
 53. See id. § 1514A(a)(2) (affording protections to those who “file, cause to be 
filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about to 
be filed . . . relating to an alleged violation of . . . any provision of Federal law 
relating to fraud against shareholders”). 
 54. See id. § 1514A(a)(1) (affording protections to those who report to Federal 
agencies, Congress, or an internal supervisor). 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
 56. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (2012) (requiring claimants to file a 
complaint with the Secretary of Labor prior to seeking relief from a federal district 
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claimant may only bring action in the federal courts if the 
Secretary fails to make a final determination within 180 days.57 By 
contrast, claimants seeking relief under Dodd–Frank’s 
anti-retaliation provisions may bring a cause of action directly to a 
federal district court.58 As a result, it is much simpler to bring a 
private employer retaliation action to the federal courts under 
Dodd–Frank than under SOX.59 Claimants under Dodd–Frank 
need not subject themselves to the Secretary of Labor, and this is 
a significant benefit that SOX claimants do not enjoy.60 
Third, Dodd–Frank arguably affords greater remedies for 
those who bring successful claims against their employers.61 
Subsection 21F states that relief for claimants shall come in three 
forms: “(i) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the 
individual would have had, but for the discrimination; (ii) 2 times 
the amount of back pay otherwise owed to the individual, with 
interest; and (iii) compensation for litigation costs, expert witness 
fees, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.”62 Remedies available under 
SOX are substantially the same, with one notable exception. 
                                                                                                     
court). 
 57. See id.  § 1514A(b)(1)(b) (“[I]f the Secretary has not issued a final decision 
within 180 days of the filing of the complaint . . . [claimant may bring] an action 
at law or equity for de novo review in the appropriate district court of the United 
States . . . .”). 
 58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (“An individual who alleges discharge or 
other discrimination in violation of subparagraph (A) may bring an action under 
this subsection in the appropriate district court of the United States for the relief 
provided in subparagraph (C).”). 
 59. See Jill L. Rosenberg & Renée B. Phillips, Whistleblower Claims Under 
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: The New 
Landscape, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, https://www.nysba.org/Sections/ 
Labor_and_Employment/Labor_PDFs/LaborMeetingsAssets/Whistleblower_Clai
ms_Under_Dodd_Frank.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (“Unlike SOX, there is no 
requirement to first file a complaint with an agency and exhaust remedies prior 
to filing a district court action.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 60. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (omitting any requirement for whistleblowers 
to submit complaints to an executive agency), with 18 U.S.C.  § 1514A (requiring 
SOX claimants to submit their claims to the Secretary of Labor prior to bringing 
their claim to the courts). 
 61. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (outlining available remedies for 
employer retaliation under Dodd–Frank), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2) (outlining 
available remedies for employer retaliation under SOX). 
 62. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (2012). 
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Dodd–Frank affords two-hundred percent back pay owed to a 
successful claimant.63 SOX, however, only allows successful 
claimants to receive one-hundred percent back pay.64 
Some scholars have noted that, despite these textual 
differences in available remedies, greater financial recompense 
may be available if an employee brings an employer retaliation 
claim under SOX.65 This view of SOX’s remedial structure stems 
primarily from Rutherford v. Jones Lang Lasalle America, Inc.66 In 
that case, the magistrate judge considered whether SOX’s 
remedies for employer retaliation permitted recovery of damages 
for emotional distress.67 The plaintiff, Rutherford, was an 
employee of Jones Lang, and had made internal reports to 
company executives that another employee may have engaged in 
illegal conduct.68 Rutherford was subsequently accused of framing 
the other employee,69 and became the target of harassment and 
other hostile working conditions.70 Rutherford eventually resigned 
from her position at Jones Lang and filed a complaint, in which she 
alleged employer retaliation under SOX.71 Rutherford’s complaint 
prayed for relief in the form of damages for “non-economic losses 
including emotional distress, mental anguish, humiliation and 
injury to her reputation.”72 
The magistrate’s reasoning focused on specific language in 
SOX’s remedy provisions,73 which provide that remedies shall 
                                                                                                     
 63. See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii) (stating that relief under Dodd–Frank shall 
include “2 times the amount of back pay otherwise owed to the individual, with 
interest”). 
 64. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(B) (stating that relief under SOX shall 
include “the amount of back pay, with interest”). 
 65. See Christina Pellino, Comment, Don’t Whistle While You Work—Unless 
You Whistle to the SEC, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 911, 932 (2016) (“Under certain 
circumstances, SOX can also provide for a greater financial reward than a claim 
under Dodd–Frank.”). 
 66. Rutherford v. Jones Lang Lasalle Am., Inc., No. 12-14422, 2013 WL 
4431269 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013). 
 67. Id. at *1. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at *2. 
 73. See id. at *3 (“SOX’s use of the terms ‘all relief necessary to make the 
employee whole,’ ‘relief . . . shall include’ and ‘compensation for any special 
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include “all relief necessary to make the employee whole” and 
“compensation for any special damages.”74 The magistrate stated 
that SOX’s remedy provisions mirror and are analogous to those of 
the False Claims Act,75 which permit recovery for emotional 
damages.76 Following the reasoning of other courts, the magistrate 
found that SOX’s remedy provisions allow recovery for emotional 
damages.77 Since the magistrate’s finding in the Rutherford case, 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have each 
concluded that SOX permits recovery based on emotional distress 
and reputational damages.78 
It seems settled, then, that the “special damages” 
contemplated under SOX include damages for emotional distress, 
reputational harm, and other noneconomic damages, and that 
these damages are ultimately couched in SOX’s mandate that 
those harmed by employer retaliation should be made whole from 
their recovery in a private action.79 Dodd–Frank’s remedy 
                                                                                                     
damages . . . including . . .’ do not support . . . a narrow a view of available 
damages.”). 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2012). 
 75. See Rutherford v. Jones Lang Lasalle Am., Inc., No. 12-14422, 2013 WL 
4431269, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013) (“SOX is more analogous to the 
whistleblower provision of the False Claims Act (‘FCA’), 31 U.S.C.  
§ 3730(h) . . . .”). 
 76. See id. (“Other circuit and district courts allow recovery of damages for 
emotional distress, mental anguish, humiliation and injury to reputation under  
§ 3730(h).” (citing Hammond v. Northland Counseling Ctr., Inc., 218 F.3d 886, 
892–93 (8th Cir. 2000))). 
 77. See id. at *5 (“This Magistrate finds the language of SOX’s remedy 
provision, analogous whistleblower statutes and decisions of the ARB support the 
recovery of damages under SOX for emotional distress, mental anguish, 
humiliation and injury to reputation.”). 
 78. See Jones v. Southpeak Interactive Corp. of Del., 777 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 
2015) (“We therefore join . . . the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, in concluding that 
emotional distress damages are available under [SOX].”); Halliburton, Inc. v. 
Admin. Review Bd., 771 F.3d 254, 266 (5th Cir. 2014)  
It would be an odd result, to say the least, to construe a statute that 
prohibits certain ‘threat[s]’ and ‘harass[ment]’ against employees and 
purports to afford ‘all relief necessary to make the employee[s] whole’ 
to not offer a remedy for the most usual and predictable result of 
threats and harassment, emotional distress. 
See also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin. Review Bd., 717 F.3d 1121, 1138 (10th 
Cir. 2013) (finding that SOX’s language permits recovery of emotional and 
noneconomic damages in employer retaliation actions). 
 79. See supra notes 65–78 and accompanying text (noting the potential for 
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provisions do not include similar language requiring that 
successful claimants be made whole.80 Thus, the claim that greater 
remuneration may be available under SOX than Dodd–Frank has 
some grounding. Yet, even those who note this possibility recognize 
that greater opportunities for recompense under SOX are 
circumstantial81 and that pursuing a claim under SOX would “be 
best for individuals who have suffered significant emotional 
harm.”82 
The anti-retaliation provisions under SOX and Dodd–Frank, 
therefore, vary greatly in both procedure and potential remedies 
for successful employer retaliation claims.83 Questions remain, 
however, as to why Congress decided to craft Dodd–Frank’s 
whistleblower protections in such a way that they vary so greatly 
from protections offered under SOX. Some have suggested that 
these variances intentionally provide differing options and 
avenues that depend on whether a claimant sues under Dodd–
Frank or SOX.84 They have also noted that these distinctions, and 
court holdings which differentiate Dodd–Frank whistleblowers 
from SOX informants, create incentives to report conduct to the 
SEC which previously did not exist under SOX.85 At this point, it 
                                                                                                     
recovery of “special damages” for emotional or reputational harm under SOX’s 
anti-retaliation provisions). 
 80. Dodd–Frank’s remedy provision reads as follows: 
Relief for an individual prevailing in an [employer retaliation action] 
shall include—(i) reinstatement with the same seniority status that 
the individual would have had, but for the discrimination; (ii) 2 times 
the amount of back pay otherwise owed to the individual, with interest; 
and (iii) compensation for litigation costs, expert witness fees, and 
reasonable attorneys’ fees. 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(C) (2012). 
 81. See Pellino, supra note 65, at 932 (“Under certain circumstances, SOX 
can also provide for a greater financial reward than a claim under Dodd–Frank.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See supra Part II.C (outlining the various distinctions between SOX and 
Dodd–Frank provisions). 
 84. See Andrew Walker, Note, Why Shouldn’t We Protect Internal 
Whistleblowers? Exploring Justifications for the Asadi Decision, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1761, 1775 (2015) (“The bottom line is that SOX provides whistleblowers with 
options outside of Dodd–Frank.”). 
 85. See id. at 1771 (“The incentives created by Asadi are clear—reporting to 
the SEC is encouraged and internal reporting is discouraged.”). 
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is necessary to discuss how the courts have addressed the issue of 
Dodd–Frank whistleblowers and the SEC’s rule interpreting 
subsection 21F. 
III. Development of the Circuit Split 
A. The SEC’s Interpretive Rule 
As mentioned above, the statutory definition of 
“whistleblower” under subsection 21F only includes those who 
report misconduct to the SEC.86 Additionally, the language of 
subsection 21F indicates that each definition listed in subsection 
(a) applies to every other provision of subsection 21F, including its 
whistleblower protections under subsection (h).87 By its own terms, 
the statute appears to say that, for purposes of every provision 
under subsection 21F, each instance of the term “whistleblower” 
refers to one or more persons who have reported misconduct to the 
SEC.88 
In 2011, the SEC released an interpretive rule that attempted 
to clarify the statutory definition of whistleblower under 
subsection 21F, but only for purposes of 21F’s anti-retaliation 
provisions.89 The interpretive rule—in a benign and unassuming 
fashion—states that: 
For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded by 
Section 21F(h)(1) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u–6(h)(1)), 
you are a whistleblower if: (i) You possess a reasonable belief 
that the information you are providing relates to a possible 
securities law violation (or, where applicable, to a possible 
violation of the provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a)) that 
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, and; (ii) You 
provide that information in a manner described in Section 
                                                                                                     
 86. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012) (“The term ‘whistleblower’ means any 
individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, 
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a 
manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”). 
 87. See id. § 78u-6(a) (“In this section the following definitions shall 
apply . . . .”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b) (2011) (“For purposes of the anti-retaliation 
protections afforded by Section 21F(h)(1) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78u-6(h)(1)), you are a whistleblower if . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)). 
(iii) The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you 
satisfy the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify 
for an award.90 
Under careful review of the above-quoted language, it is 
apparent that the SEC has omitted any language requiring a 
person or persons to report misconduct to the Commission, as is 
required by the statutory definition of a “whistleblower.”91 
Further, the SEC’s interpretive rule affords whistleblower 
status, and the anti-retaliation protections accompanying that 
status, to those who “provide . . . information in a manner 
described in Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act.”92 As noted 
above, subsection 21F(h) states that whistleblowers receive 
protections for providing information in a manner protected under 
SOX or other securities laws and regulations.93 Thus, by omitting 
the requirement to provide information “to the Commission,” the 
SEC’s interpretive rule attempts to afford Dodd–Frank 
whistleblower protections to those who do not meet the statutory 
definition of a “whistleblower” under subsection 21F(a), but who 
have made reports otherwise protected under SOX or other 
securities laws.94 This change to the anti-retaliation rules 
prompted the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to analyze the 
meaning of “whistleblower” under Dodd–Frank and ultimately 
reject the SEC’s interpretation.95 
                                                                                                     
 90. Id.  § 240.21F-2(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 91. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (requiring a person or persons to report 
“to the Commission” to qualify as a whistleblower for purposes of section 21F), 
with 17 C.F.R.  § 240.21F-2(b) (offering a definition of “whistleblower”, for 
purposes of 21F’s anti-retaliation provisions, which does not require reporting to 
the SEC). 
 92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(ii). 
 93. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2010) (stating that employers may not 
retaliate against whistleblowers for “making disclosures that are required or 
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . and any other law, rule, or 
regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.”). 
 94. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 
34300, 34304 (June 13, 2011) (“This change to the rule reflects the fact that the 
statutory anti-retaliation protections apply to three different categories of 
whistleblowers, and the third category includes individuals who report to persons 
or governmental authorities other than the Commission.”). 
 95. See infra Part III.B (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s approach to the 
“whistleblower” issue). 
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B. The Fifth Circuit Takes on the SEC: The Asadi Case 
First, it is necessary to understand the facts of the Asadi96 
case. Khaled Asadi served as G.E.’s Iraq Country Executive97 and, 
while working in that role, received information concerning 
company activities which potentially constituted violations of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).98 Instead of approaching 
the SEC, Asadi made internal reports to his superiors in the 
company.99 Shortly thereafter, company employees pressured 
Asadi to step down from his position and he was ultimately fired.100 
Asadi brought an employer retaliation suit against GE under 
Dodd–Frank and subsection 21F.101 The federal district court 
dismissed Asadi’s claim,102 prompting the Fifth Circuit to interpret 
subsection 21F on appeal.103 
On appeal, Asadi conceded that he did not fall within 
subsection 21F’s definition of “whistleblower,”104 but that 
subsection 21F’s whistleblower protections should nonetheless 
extend to his internal reports.105 Asadi based this argument on a 
perceived ambiguity engendered by the interaction between 
subsection (a), the subsection defining “whistleblower”, and 
subsection (h), which provides employer retaliation protections.106 
In essence, Asadi questioned how one can only become a 
whistleblower by reporting to the SEC, and simultaneously avail 
themselves of whistleblower protections under subsection 
21F(h)(1)(A)(iii) by making internal reports.107 
                                                                                                     
 96. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 97. Id. at 621. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 622. 
 104. Id. at 624. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 626 (“[Asadi] maintains that [subsection (h)(1)(A)(iii)] conflicts 
with the definition of ‘whistleblower.’ The basis for his contention is that an 
individual can take actions falling within this category and, if he does not report 
information to the SEC, fail to qualify as a ‘whistleblower’ under  § 78u-6(a)(6).”). 
 107. Id. 
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The court’s response was simply that any perceived conflict 
between subsection 21F(a)(6)’s “whistleblower” definition and 
subsection 21F(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s protection of whistleblowers who 
make internal reports is based in a misreading of the statute.108 
According to the Fifth Circuit, there is no conflict between these 
two subsections, which, the court stated, operate in the following 
way: 
Under Dodd–Frank’s plain language and structure, there is 
only one category of whistleblowers: individuals who provide 
information relating to a securities law violation to the SEC. 
The three categories listed in subparagraph § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) 
represent the protected activity in a whistleblower-protection 
claim. They do not, however, define which individuals qualify 
as whistleblowers.109 
The Fifth Circuit then went on to further explain the interplay 
between subsections (a) and (h) by providing a practical example 
of how they would operate in a real-world scenario: 
Assume a mid-level manager discovers a securities law 
violation. On the day he makes this discovery, he immediately 
reports this securities law violation (1) to his company’s chief 
executive officer (“CEO”) and (2) to the SEC. Unfortunately for 
the mid-level manager, the CEO, who is not yet aware of the 
disclosure to the SEC, immediately fires the mid-level manager. 
The mid-level manager, clearly a “whistleblower” as defined in 
Dodd–Frank because he provided information to the SEC 
relating to a securities law violation, would be unable to prove 
that he was retaliated against because of the report to the SEC. 
Accordingly, the first and second category of protected activity 
would not shield this whistleblower from retaliation. The third 
category of protected activity, however, protects the mid-level 
manager. In this scenario, the internal disclosure to the CEO, a 
person with supervisory authority over the mid-level manager, 
is protected under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, the anti-retaliation 
provision enacted as part of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 
(“the SOX anti-retaliation provision”). Accordingly, even though 
the CEO was not aware of the report to the SEC at the time he 
terminated the mid-level manager, the mid-level manager can 
state a claim under the Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protection 
provision because he was a “whistleblower” and suffered 
                                                                                                     
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  
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retaliation based on his disclosure to the CEO, which was 
protected under SOX.110 
This sketch is critical to the Fifth Circuit’s analysis. It 
demonstrates exactly how—in the Fifth Circuit’s view—
subsections (a) and (h) operate simultaneously without fostering 
any conflict111 or superfluousness112 within subsection 21F. 
Asadi also contended that the court should defer to the SEC 
interpretive rule.113 The Fifth Circuit responded with some disdain 
for the SEC’s rule; stating that “Congress specified that a 
‘whistleblower,’ not merely any individual, is protected from 
employer retaliation on the basis of the whistleblower’s protected 
activities. The statute, therefore, clearly expresses Congress’s 
intention to require individuals to report information to the SEC 
to qualify as a whistleblower under Dodd–Frank.”114 The court 
went so far as to say that the SEC simply redefined the term 
“whistleblower” for purposes of the anti-retaliation provisions.115  
Having concluded that section 21F’s definition of 
“whistleblower” is unambiguous,116 the Fifth Circuit only briefly 
employed the Chevron framework: 
Congress specified that a “whistleblower,” not merely any 
individual, is protected from employer retaliation on the basis 
of the whistleblower’s protected activities. The statute, 
therefore, clearly expresses Congress’s intention to require 
individuals to report information to the SEC to qualify as a 
whistleblower under Dodd–Frank. Because Congress has 
directly addressed the precise question at issue, we must reject 
                                                                                                     
 110. Id. at 627–28. 
 111. See id. at 627 (“[T]he whistleblower-protection provision does not contain 
conflicting definitions of ‘whistleblower.’”). 
 112. See id. at 628 (“As this example demonstrates, under the plain text of 
Dodd–Frank, the third category of protected activity is not superfluous.”). 
 113. Id. at 629. 
 114. Id. at 630.  
 115. See id. at 629 (“Simply put, this regulation, instead of using the statute’s 
definition of ‘whistleblower,’ redefines ‘whistleblower’ more broadly by providing 
that an individual qualifies as a whistleblower even though he never reports any 
information to the SEC, so long as he has undertaken the protected activity listed 
in 15 U.S.C.  § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).”). 
 116. Id. at 630. 
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the SEC’s expansive interpretation of the term “whistleblower” 
for purposes of the whistleblower-protection provision.117 
Later, this Note addresses Chevron’s two-step framework in 
greater detail, and specifically discusses how that framework was 
utilized in both Asadi and the Second Circuit’s opinion in Berman 
v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC.118 For now, it suffices to say that the first step 
in a Chevron-style analysis looks to “whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.”119 If so, “that is the end of 
the matter” and the court must give effect to Congress’s express 
intent.120 The Fifth Circuit found that Congress spoke directly to 
this issue when it provided an unambiguous definition of 
“whistleblower,”121 and so concluded that the SEC’s interpretive 
rule does not deserve deferential treatment.122 
It is noteworthy that Asadi could have, as an alternative to 
Dodd–Frank remedies, availed himself of SOX’s anti-retaliation 
protections in this case, but did not. Under SOX, an employer may 
not retaliate against an employee who reports misconduct within 
the firm,123 which is precisely the type of action Asadi claimed had 
precipitated his termination from G.E.124 Instead, Asadi claimed 
damages under subsection 21F and sought remedies under Dodd–
                                                                                                     
 117. Id. 
 118. Part III.F explores the Chevron framework. Part IV.A discusses Asadi’s 
application of that framework. Part IV.B delineates the Second Circuit’s analysis. 
 119. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 120. Id. at 842–43. 
 121. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(“The statute, therefore, clearly expresses Congress’s intention to require 
individuals to report information to the SEC to qualify as a whistleblower under 
Dodd–Frank.”). 
 122. See id. (“Because Congress has directly addressed the precise question 
at issue, we must reject the SEC’s expansive interpretation of the term 
‘whistleblower’ for purposes of the whistleblower-protection provision.”). 
 123. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2012) (prohibiting retaliation against an 
employee for providing information related to misconduct to “a person with 
supervisory authority over the employee”). 
 124. See Plaintiff’s Original Complaint at 5, Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 
2012 WL 2522599 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2012) (No. 4:12-cv-00345) (alleging that 
Asadi reported misconduct “to his immediate supervisor and to the 
Ombudsperson for G.E.” and was subsequently pressured out of his position in 
the company). 
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Frank: reinstatement, two times back pay, and litigation costs and 
attorneys’ fees.125 
Given that G.E. fired Asadi on June 24, 2011 and that Asadi 
did not file his original complaint until February 3, 2012, it could 
be the case that Asadi simply did not submit his claim to the 
Secretary of Labor within SOX’s 180 day statute of limitations.126 
Without more information, it is difficult to discern whether this 
was the only motivating factor behind Asadi’s decision to pursue 
Dodd–Frank remedies. There could have been many factors 
motivating Asadi’s decision to pursue Dodd–Frank remedies 
instead of following SOX procedures. For instance, Asadi could 
have been motivated by the prospect of two-hundred percent back 
pay under Dodd–Frank rather than one-hundred percent back pay 
under SOX.127 Another possible factor could have simply been that 
Asadi wanted to avoid the procedural hurdles necessary to bring a 
SOX claim, such as filing his complaint with the Secretary of Labor 
in the hopes that the Secretary would act.128 These are possible 
explanations for Asadi’s decision not to seek relief under SOX, but 
are admittedly speculative. 
One reason, however, makes itself clear upon examination of 
Asadi’s filings at the trial level: his counsel relied on a misreading 
of subsection 21F. Asadi’s memorandum in response to G.E.’s 
                                                                                                     
 125. See id. at *6–7 (praying for relief in the form of reinstatement, two times 
back pay, and litigation costs and attorney’s fees). These are the remedies 
expressly available for damages arising out of employer retaliation under 
subsection 21F. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (outlining the relief available for 
damages under subsection 21F’s anti-retaliation provisions). 
 126. See id. at *1, 4 (stating that G.E. terminated Asadi’s employment on June 
24, 2011 and indicating that Asadi filed his original complaint with the district 
court on February 3, 2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (“An 
action . . . shall be commenced not later than 180 days after the date on which the 
violation occurs, or after the date on which the employee became aware of the 
violation.”). 
 127. Dodd–Frank provides for “2 times the amount of back pay otherwise 
owed to the individual, with interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii). SOX, on the 
other hand, merely allows for “the amount of back pay, with interest.” 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1514A(c)(2)(B). 
 128. SOX requires claimants to first submit their complaint to the Secretary 
of Labor, and provides that the claimant may only proceed independently to the 
courts if the Secretary has not taken action within 180 days of claimants initial 
filing. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (outlining the required procedure for bringing 
an employer retaliation claim under SOX). 
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motion to dismiss cites Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc.129 as authority 
supporting its interpretation of Dodd–Frank.130 In that case, the 
judge declared that the “contradictory” provisions of subsection 
21F may be “harmonized” by reading subsection (h)(1)(A)(iii)’s 
protection of internal reports as a narrow exception to the 
“whistleblower” definition provided under subsection (a)(6).131 It 
appears, from this reliance on Egan, that Asadi’s counsel was 
confident enough in this reading of the statute to submit a Dodd–
Frank claim. SOX remedies were available to Asadi, and remain 
available to those who may find themselves in his position in the 
future.132 Part IV of this Note explores potential avenues by which 
SOX remedies may be made more accessible or enticing to future 
claimants, while preserving incentives to report to the SEC under 
Dodd–Frank.133 
C. Criticism of the Asadi Decision: Setting the Stage for the 
Second Circuit 
Asadi was received poorly, and most federal district courts 
rejected the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning outright.134 Often, these 
                                                                                                     
 129. No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
 130. See Plaintiff’s Amended Memorandum in Response to Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim at 8–9, Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), 
LLC, 2012 WL 2522599 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2012) (No. 4:12 cv 00345) (“In this 
case, Mr. Asadi is a whistleblower under Dodd–Frank since his internal reports 
fall under the four categories of protected disclosures articulated by the court in 
Egan.”). 
 131. See Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 4:12-cv-00345, 2011 WL 1672066, 
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011) (“The contradictory provisions of the Dodd–Frank 
Act are best harmonized by reading 15 U.S.C.  § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s protection of 
certain whistleblower disclosures not requiring reporting to the SEC as a narrow 
exception to 15 U.S.C.  § 78u-6(a)(6)’s definition of a whistleblower as one who 
reports to the SEC.”). 
 132. See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text (demonstrating that 
SOX remedies were available to Asadi at the time he brought his complaint to the 
trial court). 
 133. See infra Part IV.C (proposing a legislative solution to the policy concerns 
surrounding the Asadi approach). 
 134. See Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149, 2014 WL 
940703, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014) (dismissing the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning as 
the minority opinion and granting deference to the SEC’s interpretive rule); see 
also Yang v. Navigators Group, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(“Considering the context of 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6, the Court finds that the statute 
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courts merely pointed out that a majority of other district courts 
found ambiguity in Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower protections, 
parroted the reasoning of their fellow district courts, and 
concluded that deference to the SEC’s interpretive rule was the 
proper approach.135 Regardless of the analytical depth 
demonstrated by these decisions, the Second Circuit rightly noted 
in its Berman opinion that the majority “of district courts have 
deemed the statute ambiguous and deferred to the SEC’s Rule.”136 
Three primary criticisms of the Asadi opinion arose from the 
federal district courts. First, district courts reasoned that the 
SEC’s interpretive rule harmonizes subsection 21F’s contradictory 
sections, preventing statutory superfluousness or mootness that 
would otherwise arise under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation.137 
Second, another court has argued that the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning 
does not adequately comport with Congress’s intent to provide 
whistleblowers with a private cause of action absent the burden of 
racing their employers to the SEC.138 Third, district courts found 
that the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning did not sufficiently account for 
the overall context of the statute, and, in so doing, failed to address 
subsection 21F’s inherent ambiguity.139 
                                                                                                     
does not clearly and unambiguously limit whistleblower protection to individuals 
who report violations to the SEC where the anti-retaliation provision 
simultaneously incorporates SOX-protected reporting to supervisors.”); Ellington 
v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013) (“This court respectfully 
disagrees and instead adopts the SEC’s interpretation of the relevant provisions 
of Dodd–Frank.”). 
 135. See Ellington, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 45 (“This court also notes the numerous 
other district courts that have held that the  § 78u-6(a)(6) definition of 
‘whistleblower’ does not limit the reach of  § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).”); see also Yang, 
18 F. Supp. 3d at 533 (“[S]everal courts—including three in this district—have 
either declined to follow the Fifth Circuit or declined to rule on the issue.”). 
 136. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 137. See Khazin, 2014 WL 940703, at *6 (“The SEC’s rule harmonizes the 
contradictory provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act while not rendering any word or 
section superfluous.”); see also Yang, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 532 (positing that 
deference to the SEC’s rule would construe the statute to give effect to every word 
in subsection 21F). 
 138. See Ellington, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 45 (“Congress intended that an 
employee terminated for reporting Sarbanes–Oxley violations . . . ha[s] a private 
right of action under Dodd–Frank whether or not the employer wins the race to 
the SEC’s door with a termination notice.”). 
 139. See Yang, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 534 (“[T]he plainness or ambiguity of 
statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific 
context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as 
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Asadi could find no safe haven in the ivory tower, either. Legal 
scholars jumped at the opportunity to skewer the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning as creating an illusory result,140 incorrectly applying the 
Chevron test,141 or failing to grasp the full scheme of the federal 
securities laws and creating poor public policy outcomes.142 This 
Note will address these arguments later,143 but will first provide a 
brief summary of Asadi’s reception in the courts and in the halls of 
academia prior to the Second Circuit’s Berman opinion. 
D. The Second Circuit Weighs in: The Berman Case 
The Second Circuit tackled the Dodd–Frank “whistleblower” 
issue in 2015 after Berman appealed the district court’s dismissal 
of his case.144 According to Berman’s factual allegations, Berman 
was employed as the finance director of Neo@Ogilvy LLC, and was 
responsible for generating Neo@Ogilvy’s financial reports as well 
as internal auditing for Neo@Ogilvy’s parent company.145 Berman 
claimed that he discovered various violations of Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), SOX, and Dodd–Frank, 
                                                                                                     
a whole.” (quoting Virgilio v. City of New York, 407 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2005))). 
 140. See Mystica M. Alexander, John O. Hayward & David Missirian, Asadi: 
Renegade or Precursor of Who is a Whistleblower Under the Dodd–Frank Act?, 35 
PACE L. REV. 887, 916 (2015) (“Viewing the definition of whistleblower narrowly 
and in isolation, as was done in Asadi, creates the illusion of clarity.”). 
 141. See Caroline E. Keen, Clarifying What is “Clear”: Reconsidering 
Whistleblower Protections Under Dodd–Frank, 19 N.C. BANKING INST. 215, 226 
(2015) (“Asadi did not follow the Chevron process, but instead used canons of 
statutory construction to avoid contradicting sections of the statute and 
surplusage.”); see also Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd–Frank 
Whistleblower Program’s Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 
TEMP. L. REV. 721, 747 (2014) (“The decision in Asadi is flawed because it fails to 
acknowledge that the language of the statute is ambiguous on its face, thereby 
bypassing the need to grant Chevron deference to the SEC’s reasonable 
construction of the statute, which protects internal whistleblowers.”). 
 142. See Pellino, supra note 65, at 932 (arguing that the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning fails to consider the role of other securities laws and whistleblower 
protections). 
 143. See infra Part IV (arguing that the legal result is clear, but that the 
resulting policy should change by legislative means). 
 144. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, 801 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The 
District Court dismissed the Dodd–Frank claims because Berman had been 
terminated long before he reported alleged violations to the SEC.”). 
 145. Id. at 148–49. 
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and that he reported these violations internally to senior 
employees of both Neo@Ogilvy and its parent company.146 Berman 
claimed that he was subsequently fired as a result of his internal 
whistleblowing.147 Berman did not report any of Neo@Ogilvy’s 
alleged misconduct to the SEC until months after he was fired.148 
The Second Circuit began its analysis by conceding that there 
is “no absolute conflict” between subsection 21F’s definition of 
“whistleblower” and its anti-retaliation provisions.149 Indeed, the 
court flatly admits at the outset of its analysis that the two 
provisions operate simultaneously and without conflict.150 How, 
then, did the Second Circuit conclude that the SEC’s interpretive 
rule should receive deference from the courts? The answer stems 
                                                                                                     
 146. Id. at 149. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. (“In October 2013, after the limitations period on one of his 
Sarbanes–Oxley claims had ended, he provided information to the Commission.”). 
 149. Id. at 150. 
 150. See id. at 150–51 
An employee who suffers retaliation after reporting wrongdoing 
simultaneously to his employer and to the SEC is eligible for Dodd–
Frank remedies and those provided by Sarbanes–Oxley. Subdivision 
(iii) assures him the latter remedies, and his simultaneous report to 
the SEC assures him that he will not have excluded himself from 
Dodd–Frank remedies. 
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from King v. Burwell,151 a Supreme Court case from earlier in 
2015.152 
The Second Circuit took time to note the similarity between 
King and the case before it.153 However, instead of foregoing the 
Chevron approach altogether—as the Supreme Court chose to do 
in King—the Second Circuit claimed that its analysis must root 
itself firmly in the Chevron framework.154 It is critically important 
to understand exactly how the Second Circuit styled the issue in 
this case. The court set forth the issue as follows: 
In our case, the statutory provision relied on by the Appellees 
and our dissenting colleague contains the phrase “provide . . . to 
the Commission,” but the issue is not whether that phrase 
means something other than what it literally says. Instead, the 
issue is whether the statutory provision applies to another 
provision of the statute, or, more precisely, whether the answer 
to that question is sufficiently unclear to warrant Chevron 
deference to the Commission’s regulation.155 
                                                                                                     
 151. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). In King, the Court undertook the task of 
determining the correct interpretation of subsection 36B of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act. Id. at 2483. That section states that the Affordable Care 
Act’s tax credits are available in amounts dependent upon whether the taxpayer’s 
health insurance was purchased through “an Exchange established by the state.” 
Id. at 2487. Effectively, the issue was the meaning of the word “state,” and 
whether the Affordable Care Act’s tax credits were available to taxpayers in 
States that have a Federal, rather than a State-created, exchange. Id. The 
Internal Revenue Service had released its own interpretation of subsection 36B, 
but the Court did not employ the Chevron test in this case, reasoning only that 
this was an extraordinary case in which Congress did not intend to delegate 
authority to the Internal Revenue Service. Id. at 2488–89. The Court reasoned 
that, although a plain reading of the statute would render tax credits inapplicable 
in States which did not establish health care exchanges, reading the statute so 
narrowly would defeat Congress’s purpose in enacting the Affordable Care Act. 
Id. at 2492–94. The Court ultimately concluded that subsection 36B can only be 
read in a way which comports with that purpose. Id. at 2496. Thus, the Court 
found that subsection 36B’s language—“Exchange established by the state”—
applies to exchanges established by the States and the Federal government. Id.  
 152. See infra Part IV.B (explicating the Second Circuit’s covert use of King’s 
analytical method). 
 153. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting 
that the issue presented in King also involved a statute without a clear conflict 
among its provisions). 
 154. See id. at 150 (stating that the King case was “far more problematic,” and 
that the Berman case is one in which the Chevron test must apply). 
 155. Id. 
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The foregoing passage is critical because the Second Circuit 
did not employ the Chevron framework in the Berman case.156 
Rather, the court utilized a King-style analysis to sidestep the first 
prong of the Chevron analysis altogether.157 
The Second Circuit acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit’s 
Asadi analysis reconciles, to an extent, any perceived statutory 
conflict.158 The court also stated, however, that Asadi’s 
“employer/Commission reporting example”—quoted above159—
does not entirely eliminate what the court perceived to be the 
“tension” among subsection 21F’s provisions.160 In the end, the 
Second Circuit attacked the Asadi decision on the grounds that it 
severely limits the scope of Dodd–Frank whistleblower protections 
in two ways.161 First, the court stated that the Fifth Circuit’s 
application of plain language would require employees to report 
within their organization and to the SEC simultaneously to receive 
Dodd–Frank protections under § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), and that it 
would be extremely rare for an employee to choose to report in this 
fashion.162 Second, the court noted that there are certain actors—
such as auditors and lawyers—who, under SOX, are required to 
report internally prior to reporting misconduct to the SEC.163 The 
Second Circuit concluded that, as a result of these provisions, 
“there would be virtually no situation where an SEC reporting 
requirement would leave subdivision (iii) with any scope.”164 
                                                                                                     
 156. See infra Part IV.B (describing the Second Circuit’s use of a King-style 
analysis as the guidepost for its analytical method in Berman). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Berman, 801 F.3d at 151. 
 159. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (quoting the Fifth Circuit’s 
illustration of subsection 21F’s operation). 
 160. Berman, 801 F.3d at 151. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id.  
First, although there may be some potential whistleblowers who will 
report wrongdoing simultaneously to their employer and the 
Commission, they are likely to be few in number. Some will surely feel 
that reporting only to their employer offers the prospect of having the 
wrongdoing ended, with little chance of retaliation, whereas reporting 
to a government agency creates a substantial risk of retaliation. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 152. 
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Having confronted the scope of § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) under a 
plain text analysis and found it dissatisfying, the Second Circuit 
then sought some clarity in subsection 21F’s legislative history.165 
However, any appeal to legislative history in this instance is, as 
the Second Circuit correctly noted, futile.166 This is simply because 
the legislative history of subsection 21F yields no set of 
Congressional records or committee notes from which to derive 
Congress’s intentions behind § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).167 
Finding no solace in the pertinent legislative history, the 
Second Circuit marched onward, ultimately opining that the court 
“think[s] it doubtful that the conferees who accepted the 
last-minute insertion of subdivision (iii) would have expected it to 
have the extremely limited scope it would have if it were restricted 
by the Commission reporting requirement in the ‘whistleblower’ 
definition in subsection 21F(a)(6).”168 Given the court’s skepticism, 
it should not come as a surprise that the Second Circuit concluded 
that the “tension” between subsection 21F’s terms rendered it 
sufficiently ambiguous to grant deference to the SEC’s interpretive 
rule.169  
                                                                                                     
 165. See id. 
In light of these realities as to the sharply limiting effect of a 
Commission reporting requirement on all whistleblowers seeking the 
Sarbanes–Oxley remedies promised by Dodd–Frank for those who 
report wrongdoing internally, the question becomes whether Congress 
intended to add subdivision (iii) to subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) only to 
achieve such a limited result. To answer that question we would 
normally look to the legislative history of subdivision (iii) to learn what 
Congress, or the relevant committee, had sought to accomplish by 
adding subdivision (iii). 
 166. See id. (“Unfortunately [the legislative history] yields nothing. What 
became subdivision (iii) . . . was not in either version of Dodd–Frank that was 
passed by the House and the Senate prior to a conference.”). 
 167. See id. at 153 (“Unfortunately, there is no mention of the addition of 
subdivision (iii), much less its meaning or intended purpose, in any legislative 
materials—not in the conference report nor the final passage debates on Dodd–
Frank in either the House or the Senate.”). 
 168. Id. at 155. 
 169. See id. (“[W]e need not definitively construe the statute, because, at a 
minimum, the tension between the definition in subsection 21F(a)(6) and the 
limited protection provided by subdivision (iii) of subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) if it is 
subject to that definition renders section 21F as a whole sufficiently 
ambiguous . . . .”). 
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Before reaching its ultimate conclusion, the court took some 
more time to distinguish its analysis from King.170 The Supreme 
Court in King, said the Second Circuit, determined that the IRS 
lacked the expertise to interpret the provision at issue in that 
case.171 The SEC, by contrast, has the knowledge and expertise to 
resolve the perceived tension in subsection 21F, according to the 
Second Circuit.172 Thus, the Second Circuit, unlike the Supreme 
Court in King, concluded that it did not need to resolve the 
ambiguity itself, and could rely on the agency’s interpretive rule.173 
Having once again found the need to distinguish itself from the 
Supreme Court and King, the Second Circuit concluded that it 
should grant deference to the SEC interpretive rule, and that 
Berman was able to pursue private anti-retaliation claims under 
Dodd–Frank.174 The Second Circuit’s deference to the SEC created 
a circuit split regarding whether courts should grant Chevron 
deference to the SEC’s interpretation of subsection 21F. 
E. The Ninth Circuit’s View: The Somers Case 
In March of 2017, the Ninth Circuit handed down its take on 
subsection 21F.175 Somers concerns Paul Somers, a former 
employee of Digital Realty Trust, Inc.176 Digital Realty Trust 
terminated Somers’s employment after “he made several reports 
to senior management regarding possible securities law violations 
by the company,” but before Somers could issue a report to the 
SEC.177 After noting that the district court adopted the Second 
Circuit’s Berman approach,178 the court explored the issue for 
itself. 
                                                                                                     
 170. See id. (arguing that the analysis employed is notably distinct from the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in the King case). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See generally Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 
2017) (relying on King to conclude that subsection 21F unambiguously affords 
“whistleblower” protections to those who do not report to the SEC). 
 176. Id. at 1047. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. (“Having analyzed the tension between the definition and anti-
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Much like the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit expressly 
acknowledges that subsection 21F defines the term 
“whistleblower” and that the definition only includes those who 
report to the SEC.179 Additionally, like the Second Circuit, the 
court reviews this definition in the context of subsection 
(h)(1)(A)(iii) and concludes that applying the definition as written 
would narrow the scope of that subsection “to the point of 
absurdity.”180 Somers then diverges from the Second Circuit’s line 
of reasoning—expressly utilizing King to argue that “[t]he use of a 
term in one part of a statute ‘may mean [a] different thing[ ]’ in a 
different part, depending on context,” even where a statute has 
expressly defined that term.181 The court then summarily 
concludes that “[Dodd–Frank]’s anti-retaliation provision 
unambiguously and expressly protects from retaliation all those 
who report to the SEC and who report internally.”182  
This conclusion required the Ninth Circuit to discard the 
statutory definition altogether. The court states that “[r]eading the 
use of the word ‘whistleblower’ in the anti-retaliation provision to 
incorporate the earlier, narrow definition would make little 
practical sense and undercut congressional intent.”183 This must 
be true, says the court, even though, as it explicitly admits, 
“Subdivision (iii) was added after the bill went through Committee. 
There is no legislative history explaining its purpose.”184 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded its opinion with this statement: 
For all these reasons, we conclude that subdivision (iii) of 
section 21F should be read to provide protections to those who 
report internally as well as to those who report to the SEC. We 
also agree with the Second Circuit that, even if the use of the 
word ‘‘whistleblower’’ in the anti-retaliation provision creates 
                                                                                                     
retaliation provisions, the district court deferred to the SEC's interpretation that 
individuals who report internally only are nonetheless protected from retaliation 
under [Dodd–Frank].”). 
 179. See id. at 1048 (admitting that subsection (a)(6)’s 
“definition . . . describes only those who report information to the SEC”). 
 180. See id. at 1049 (“[T]he only class of employees protected would be those 
who had reported possible securities violations both internally and to the 
SEC . . . .”). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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uncertainty because of the earlier narrow definition of the term, 
the agency responsible for enforcing the securities laws has 
resolved any ambiguity and its regulation is entitled to 
deference.185 
The Ninth Circuit has essentially stated that—even if its 
King-based analysis is incorrect—the statute must afford 
protection to those who do not report misconduct to the SEC. 
F. The Chevron Two-Step 
Both the Fifth Circuit and Second Circuit claimed to utilize 
the Chevron test in their examination of subsection 21F and the 
SEC’s interpretive rule.186 Given Chevron’s prevalence and 
centrality to the issue at hand, it is necessary to expound upon and 
understand this test, and also to understand what the test is 
designed to accomplish. The Chevron test is the last piece of the 
analytical puzzle.  
In Chevron, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of 
whether or not to grant deference to a rule promulgated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) purporting to interpret 
the Clean Air Act.187 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, 
articulated the test that has remained the most salient expression 
of judicial deference in the field of administrative law.188 The first 
step, said the Court, is to ask whether Congress has “directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.”189 If so, then the inquiry 
                                                                                                     
 185. Id. at 1050 (emphasis added). 
 186. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(“Congress defined ‘whistleblower’ in § 78u-6(a)(6), and did so unambiguously.”); 
see also Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating 
that analysis of the SEC’s interpretive rule requires application of the Chevron 
test). 
 187. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
840 (1984) (“The question presented by these cases is whether EPA’s decision to 
allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same 
industrial grouping as though they were encased within a single ‘bubble’ is based 
on a reasonable construction of the statutory term ‘stationary source.’”). 
 188. See Cass. R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006) 
(“[T]he [Chevron] decision has become foundational, even a quasi-constitutional 
text—the undisputed starting point for any assessment of the allocation of 
authority between federal courts and administrative agencies.”). 
 189. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
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ends because Congress has made its intent clear, and “the court, 
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”190 If the statute at hand is 
ambiguous, however, the Court stated that a reviewing court 
should move to the second step, which asks whether or not the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute is “permissible.”191  The 
Court further clarified this point, stating that an agency’s 
interpretation must merely be a reasonable interpretation of the 
statute, and not necessarily the only possible interpretation or the 
best possible interpretation of the statute.192 
The purpose undergirding the first step is plain and 
uncontroversial: the Constitution grants supreme legislative 
authority to the United States Congress,193 and so if Congress’s 
word—as written in properly enacted legislation—is clear and 
unambiguous on its own terms, then it is not within the province 
of the judicial or executive branches to change that word or its 
plain meaning.194 The second step, however, requires more 
explanation because it appears to subvert the traditional power of 
the judiciary in favor of executive agencies.195 Despite the Court’s 
insistence to the contrary,196 some have pointed out that Chevron 
operates to the detriment of the oldest, most critical precept of 
American judiciary authority—judicial review—by affording 
                                                                                                     
 190. Id. at 842–43. 
 191. Id. at 843. 
 192. See id. at 843 n.11 (“The court need not conclude that the agency 
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the 
construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question 
initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”). 
 193. See U.S. CONST. art. I,  § 1 (“All legislative powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and 
a House of Representatives.” (emphasis added)). 
 194. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that 
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 
 195. See Sunstein, supra note 188, at 188–89 (“Chevron was quickly taken to 
establish a new approach to judicial review of agency interpretations of law, going 
so far as to create a kind of counter-Marbury for the administrative state.”).  
 196. See U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984) (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction 
and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear 
congressional intent.”). 
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agencies the authority to say what the law is in certain 
instances.197 
Why, then, should a court charged with “the province and 
duty . . . to say what the law is”198 defer to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of a statute? The Chevron Court devoted only a 
small portion of its opinion to answering this question, and rested 
its deferential posture on the notion that agency rule makers have 
greater expertise than judges in their respective fields.199 As a 
result, said the Court, those rule makers are far better suited to 
implement the policy decisions of the incumbent executive 
administration,200 and should receive deference unless they exceed 
the bounds of the authority delegated to their agency by 
Congress.201 
In sum, the Chevron test operates as follows: a court must first 
determine whether Congress has clearly and unambiguously 
spoken to the issue which the agency’s rule attempts to address.202 
If not, the reviewing court may proceed to the second step, but may 
only grant deference to the agency’s rule if that rule is a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute at issue.203 
                                                                                                     
 197. See Sunstein, supra note 163, at 190 
Chevron has signaled a substantial increase in agency discretion to 
make policy through statutory interpretation. For this reason, Chevron 
might well be seen not only as a kind of counter-Marbury, but even 
more fundamentally as the administrative state’s very own McCulloch 
v. Maryland, permitting agencies to do as they wish so long as there is 
a reasonable connection between their choices and congressional 
instructions. 
 198. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 199. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (contrasting the relative expertise of judges 
in the minutia of administrative rules to that of agency rule makers). 
 200. See id. (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the 
Government to make such policy choices . . . .”). 
 201. See id. (“Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political 
interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences. In 
contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making 
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the 
[Executive’s policy views] to inform its judgments.”). 
 202. Id. at 842–43. 
 203. See id. at 843 (calling for judicial deference to “permissible” agency 
interpretations of vague and ambiguous statutory provisions). 
WHISTLING LOUD AND CLEAR 547 
IV. The Path Forward 
A. Dodd–Frank is Clear: Employing Chevron to Resolve the Split 
The Fifth Circuit, in Asadi, and the Second Circuit, in Berman, 
both cited the Chevron test as their guidepost for determining 
whether to grant deference to the SEC’s interpretive rule.204 Both 
courts were correct to do so. Chevron is the central doctrine 
employed “[w]hen reviewing an administrative agency’s 
construction of a statute.”205 The SEC has promulgated a rule that 
advances a particular interpretation of Dodd–Frank’s 
whistleblower protections,206 and the question is whether or not 
the judiciary should defer to that interpretation. 
Following the Chevron framework, the analysis begins with 
whether or not Congress directly spoke to the issue at hand. In 
other words, did Congress define the term “whistleblower” in such 
a way that is clear and unambiguous, and in such a way that it 
does not conflict with other provisions of subsection 21F? The 
definition of whistleblower under subsection 21F is as follows: “The 
term ‘whistleblower’ means any individual who provides, or 2 or 
more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating 
to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner 
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”207  
By itself, this definition is clear, but the alleged ambiguity 
arises out of the application of this definition to subsection 21F’s 
anti-retaliation provisions,208 and so a court should examine this 
                                                                                                     
 204. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 148 (“[T]he more precise issue in the pending 
appeal is whether the arguable tension between the definitional section of 
subsection 21F(a)(6) and subdivision (iii) of subsection 21(F)(h)(1)(A) creates 
sufficient ambiguity as to the coverage of subdivision (iii) to oblige us to give 
Chevron deference to the SEC’s rule.”); see also Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 
720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013) (beginning and ending its Chevron analysis on 
the first step by determining that the statutory definition of “whistleblower” is 
unambiguous). 
 205. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 470 (2016). 
 206. See 17 C.F.R.  § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(ii) (2016) (interpreting subsection 21F’s 
definition of “whistleblower” to include those employees who have made 
disclosures internally, and not to the SEC). 
 207. 15 U.S.C.  § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012). 
 208. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 147 (“[The] arguable tension between the 
definitional subsection . . . which defines ‘whistleblower’ to mean an individual 
who reports violations to the Commission, and subdivision (iii) of subsection 
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definition in the context of those provisions.209 The pertinent 
anti-retaliation section reads: 
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, 
directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate 
against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of 
employment because of any lawful act done by the 
whistleblower— 
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this 
chapter, including section 78j-1(m) of this title, section 1513(e) 
of Title 18, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission.210 
Given that § 78u-6(a)(6) defines the term “whistleblower,” it is 
appropriate to substitute every instance of that term with the 
statutory definition to determine whether a conflict exists between 
the above-quoted provisions.211 After all, “[t]he thing about a 
                                                                                                     
21F(h)(1)(A), which, unlike subdivisions (i) and (ii), does not within its own terms 
limit its protection to those who report wrongdoing to the SEC.”); see also Yang v. 
Navigators Group, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Considering the 
context of 15 U.S.C.  § 78u-6, the Court finds that the statute does not clearly and 
unambiguously limit whistleblower protection to individuals who report 
violations to the SEC where the anti-retaliation provision simultaneously 
incorporates SOX-protected reporting to supervisors.”); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 
977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013) (deferring to the SEC’s interpretation of 
subsection 21F’s provisions). 
 209. As the Supreme Court has articulated, courts generally appeal first to 
the “plain meaning” canon of statutory interpretation, which requires that “the 
meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in 
which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is 
to enforce it according to its terms.” Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 
(1917); see also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“Any effort to understand rather than to rewrite a law must accept 
and apply the presumption that lawmakers use words in ‘their natural and 
ordinary signification.’” (quoting Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. W. Union Telegraph 
Co., 96 U.S. 1, 12 (1878))). The Court has also indicated that, “where a word is 
capable of many meanings,” a reviewing court should employ the canon noscitur 
a sociis, which permits interpreting the meaning of a term by examining it within 
its surrounding statutory provisions. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 
2368 (2016). 
 210. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 
 211. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[S]ound interpretation requires paying attention to the whole law, not homing 
in on isolated words or even isolated sections. Context always matters. Let us not 
forget, however, why context matters: It is a tool for understanding the terms of 
the law, not an excuse for rewriting them.”). 
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definition is that it is, well, definitional.”212 If one took the crux of 
subsection (a)(6)’s definition and substituted every instance of 
“whistleblower” with that definition, subsection (h)(1)(a)(iii) would 
read: 
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, 
directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate 
against, a [person who reports misconduct to the Commission] 
in the terms and conditions of employment because of any 
lawful act done by the [person who reports misconduct to the 
Commission]— 
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this 
chapter, including section 78j 1(m) of this title, section 1513(e) 
of Title 18, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission.213 
When presented in this fashion, it becomes clear that 
subsection (h)(1)(a)(iii) and the definition of “whistleblower” under 
subsection (a)(6) are entirely compatible.214 As the Fifth Circuit 
determined in 2013, the prohibition imposed by (h)(1)(A)(iii) 
operates to protect those who have made reports which are 
protected by SOX, but only if those persons have also reported 
misconduct to the SEC.215 Not only is the meaning of the statutory 
definition under (a)(6) plain in its own right,216 that subsection also 
fits into the general scheme of subsection 21F, such that subsection 
(h)(1)(A)(iii) is not rendered conflicting or superfluous by its 
operation.217 As a result, a court’s inquiry should end here, refuse 
                                                                                                     
 212. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 158 (2d Cir. 2015) (Jacobs, 
J., dissenting). 
 213. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012); accord id. § 78u-6(a)(6) (defining a 
whistleblower as a person or persons who report misconduct “to the 
Commission”). 
 214. In Part III.A, this Note quoted a portion of the Asadi opinion which 
serves to illustrate (h)(1)(A)(iii)’s operation in practice. See supra note 110 and 
accompanying text (operationalizing subsection 21F’s anti-retaliation provisions). 
 215. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(“While it is correct that individuals may take protected activity yet still not 
qualify as a whistleblower, that practical result does not render  
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) conflicting or superfluous.”). 
 216. See id. at 625 (“Under Dodd–Frank’s plain language and structure, there 
is only one category of whistleblowers: individuals who provide information 
relating to a securities law violation to the SEC.”). 
 217. See id. at 626 (reasoning that the provisions of subsection 21F do not 
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to advance to Chevron’s second step, and thereby reject the 
agency’s interpretive rule as an undue exercise of power which 
Congress has reserved for itself. Whether this legal outcome makes 
for good policy, however, is a separate issue which this Note will 
address in Part IV.C.218 
B. What Went Wrong? Explaining Berman’s Reasoning 
Yet, if subsection 21F’s language is so plain, how does one 
explain the Second Circuit’s rejection of the Fifth Circuit’s 
analysis? As alluded to above, the Second Circuit utilized an 
analytical method employed by the Supreme Court in King v. 
Burwell.219 In that decision, the Supreme Court addressed whether 
a federal health insurance exchange is an exchange which is 
“established by the State” under the Affordable Care Act.220 First, 
however, the Court addressed whether to grant Chevron deference 
to an IRS interpretation of that phrase.221 Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the Chevron approach was 
not appropriate in King because “[t]he tax credits are among the 
Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each 
year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of 
people.”222 The Court stated that any interpretation of “established 
by the State” was so central to the Affordable Care Act’s statutory 
scheme that Congress could not have intended to delegate that 
interpretation to an executive agency without expressly doing 
so.223 
                                                                                                     
conflict with one another). 
 218. See infra Part IV.C (noting policy considerations and proposing a 
legislative path forward). 
 219. See supra notes 152–157 and accompanying text (claiming that the 
Second Circuit sidestepped Chevron’s first step via a King-style analysis). 
 220. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2490 (2015) (“[W]e must determine 
whether a Federal Exchange is ‘established by the State’ for purposes of Section 
36B.”). 
 221. See id. at 2488–89 (deciding that applying Chevron would be 
inappropriate in this case). 
 222. Id. at 2489. 
 223. See id. (“Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is 
thus a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is central to this 
statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it 
surely would have done so expressly.”). 
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The King decision marks a doctrinal shift which premises 
itself on the view that executive interpretation cannot resolve 
every statutory ambiguity.224 Indeed, this shift indicates that 
ambiguities may arise out of a statutory provision’s apparent 
conflict with what a court perceives to be the principal statutory 
scheme.225 Yale Law Professor Abbe R. Gluck refers to this shift as 
the “plan” concept, in which a statutory provision is ambiguous 
when it is “fundamentally inconsistent with a statute’s 
overarching plan.”226 Professor Gluck further notes that the 
Berman court used this plan concept as its method to analyze 
subsection 21F of the Dodd–Frank Act.227 Yet, the Supreme Court 
expressly rejected using the Chevron approach,228 while the Second 
Circuit’s opinion in Berman claims to embrace Chevron as its 
analytical framework.229 How could the Second Circuit have made 
use of King’s plan concept and Chevron simultaneously? 
Recall that the first step in a Chevron analysis is to ask 
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue.”230 A court only moves on to the second step “if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.”231 Also 
                                                                                                     
 224. See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding 
Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 96 
(2015) (“One way to understand all of this is to view the Court’s sidestepping of 
Chevron as actually a new doctrinal move: namely, that not every ambiguity in 
an imperfect and complicated statute creates interpretive space for the agency.”). 
 225. See id. (“There might be a gap that implicates politics or policy, but it 
might be a question that Congress itself has clearly settled in the scheme as a 
whole.”). 
 226. See id. (arguing that the Court’s analysis in King suggests that such a 
fundamental inconsistency engenders a statutory ambiguity beyond any 
executive agency’s interpretive competence). 
 227. See id. at 96 n.204 (noting that the Second Circuit employed the plan 
concept in its Berman opinion). 
 228. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (deciding not to 
utilize the Chevron approach because the IRS, in the Court’s view, is not 
competent to interpret central, fundamental provisions of the Affordable Care 
Act). 
 229. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(concluding that subsection 21F is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant Chevron 
deference). 
 230. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842 (1984) (“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.”). 
 231. Id. at 843. 
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remember that the central issue in Berman was whether or not 
Berman’s internal reporting activities made him a whistleblower 
under subsection 21F.232 The Second Circuit, however, did not seek 
to establish whether Congress spoke precisely to this issue.233 
Rather, the Second Circuit sought to establish “whether the 
arguable tension between the definitional section of subsection 
21F(a)(6) and subdivision (iii) of subsection 21(F)(h)(1)(A) creates 
sufficient ambiguity as to the coverage of subdivision (iii) to oblige 
[the court] to give Chevron deference to the SEC’s rule.”234 Styling 
the issue in this fashion presumes that Congress spoke 
ambiguously, and phrases the question as one of degree rather 
than kind. Once again, the proper inquiry is whether Congress 
clearly spoke to the issue,235 and not whether a presupposed 
ambiguity is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant Chevron deference. 
Ambiguity is a term which is commonly understood to mean 
“[t]he quality of being open to more than one interpretation” or 
“inexactness.”236 Ultimately, the Second Circuit’s finding of an 
ambiguity in subsection 21F rests on the fact that a literal 
application of subsection 21F’s whistleblower definition to 
subsection (h)(1)(A)(iii)’s protection for whistleblowers who make 
reports under SOX severely limits the scope of subsection 
(h)(1)(A)(iii).237 This, says the Second Circuit, is likely not to have 
                                                                                                     
 232. See Berman, 801 F.3d at 147 (“In operational terms, the issue is whether 
an employee who suffers retaliation because he reports wrongdoing internally, 
but not to the SEC, can obtain the retaliation remedies provided by Dodd–
Frank.”). 
 233. See id. at 148 (“So the more precise issue in the pending appeal is 
whether the arguable tension between the definitional section of subsection 
21F(a)(6) and subdivision (iii) of subsection 21(F)(h)(1)(A) creates sufficient 
ambiguity as to the coverage of subdivision (iii) to oblige us to give Chevron 
deference to the SEC’s rule.”). 
 234. Id. (emphasis added). 
 235. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (“First, always, is the question whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”). 
 236. See Ambiguity, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://en.oxford 
dictionaries.com/definition/ambiguity (last visited February 23, 2017) (defining 
the word “ambiguity”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 237. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e 
think it doubtful that the conferees who accepted the last-minute insertion of 
subdivision (iii) would have expected it to have the extremely limited scope it 
would have if it were restricted by the Commission reporting requirement in the 
‘whistleblower’ definition in subsection 21F(a)(6).”). 
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been what legislators intended to accomplish with subsection 
21F,238 despite the lack of legislative history to support its 
assertion.239  
This is how the Second Circuit chose to employ King’s plan 
concept. Instead of searching the statute to determine whether 
Congress had directly and clearly spoken to the issue, the court 
chose to declare the existence of an ambiguity from the 
unsupported assertion that a literal application of subsection 21F’s 
“whistleblower” definition limited the statute’s application in 
direct contravention of the legislature’s plan.240 If the Second 
Circuit had adhered to Chevron, it would have been compelled to 
conclude that Congress clearly spoke to the issue of who qualifies 
as a whistleblower—even when applied to subsection 21F’s 
anti-retaliation provisions.241 
It is worth noting that the Ninth Circuit’s Somers opinion did 
not even attempt to employ Chevron. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit 
only mentions Chevron in a brief comment on Berman.242 The 
Ninth Circuit expressly rested its entire analysis on King, arguing 
that—because Congress could not have included subsection 
(h)(1)(A)(iii) without planning to protect informants who do not 
report to the SEC—the meaning of “whistleblower” in that 
subsection must include those who do not report to the SEC.243 
Thus, says the Ninth Circuit, the meaning of “whistleblower” in 
subsection (h)(1)(A)(iii) unambiguously protects those who fall 
                                                                                                     
 238. See id. (doubting that Congress intended the “whistleblower” definition 
to limit subsection 21F’s retaliation protections to those who reported misconduct 
to the SEC). 
 239. See id. (“[N]o legislative history even hints at an answer.”). 
 240. See supra notes 237–239 and accompanying text (describing the Second 
Circuit’s method for finding ambiguity within subsection 21F of Dodd–Frank). 
 241. See Puffenbarger v. Engility Corp., 151 F. Supp. 3d 651, 664–65 (E.D. 
Va. 2015) (“Thus, because ‘the intent of Congress is clear,’ as the statute directly 
and unambiguously limits whistleblower protection to individuals who report to 
the SEC, it is necessary to ‘give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress,’ and . . . reject the SEC’s more expansive interpretation of the term 
‘whistleblower.’”). 
 242. See Somers v. Digital Trust Realty, Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1046 (9th Cir. 
2017) (“The Second Circuit, viewing the statute itself as ambiguous, applied 
Chevron deference to the SEC's regulation.”). 
 243. See id. at 1049 (“Reading the use of the word ‘whistleblower’ in the anti-
retaliation provision to incorporate the earlier, narrow definition would make 
little practical sense and undercut congressional intent.”). 
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outside of subsection (a)(6)’s express definition.244 In an effort to 
hedge against reversal, the court merely incorporates Berman’s 
analysis as an argument in the alternative.245 
Recall that the Supreme Court’s analysis in King rested on the 
notion that the statutory provision at issue was so central to 
Congress’s plan that it would be inappropriate to utilize the 
Chevron standard.246 In King, the Court explained that:  
The tax credits are among the [Affordable Care Act]’s key 
reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year and 
affecting the price of health insurance for millions of people. 
Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is 
thus a question of deep “economic and political significance” 
that is central to this statutory scheme . . . .247 
Subsection 21F is not central to Dodd–Frank’s overall scheme in 
the same way that the tax credits at issue in King were central to 
the Affordable Care Act.248 The Ninth Circuit’s primary thrust for 
employing King repeats the Second Circuit’s reasoning that certain 
individuals, such as auditors and lawyers, would be unable to avail 
themselves of Dodd–Frank remedies in most circumstances.249 
This outcome does not involve “billions of dollars in spending each 
                                                                                                     
 244. See id. (“[Dodd–Frank]’s anti-retaliation provision unambiguously and 
expressly protects from retaliation all those who report to the SEC and who report 
internally.”). 
 245. See id. at 1050  
[W]e conclude that subdivision (iii) of section 21F should be read to 
provide protections to those who report internally as well as to those 
who report to the SEC. We also agree with the Second Circuit that, 
even if the use of the word “whistleblower” in the anti-retaliation 
provision creates uncertainty because of the earlier narrow definition 
of the term, the agency responsible for enforcing the securities laws 
has resolved any ambiguity and its regulation is entitled to deference. 
 246. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (explaining the 
Court’s refusal to utilize Chevron in the King case). 
 247. Id. at 2489. 
 248. Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower protection scheme operates only when a 
whistleblower’s employer retaliates against the whistleblower for undertaking 
certain protected actions. By contrast, “[w]ithout the federal subsidies . . . . the 
[healthcare] exchanges would not operate as Congress intended and may not 
operate at all.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2674 (2012) 
(joint dissenting opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.). 
 249. See Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049 (noting that, under SOX, auditors and 
lawyers are required to report misconduct internally prior to reporting to any 
external entity). 
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year,” does not affect “millions of people”, and is not “a question of 
deep ‘economic and political significance’” which determines the 
success or failure of the entirety of Dodd–Frank. Resorting to King, 
or even employing a King-style analysis, is an inappropriate 
method to determine the meaning of subsection 21F and is 
inappropriate to determine whether to defer to the SEC’s 
interpretive rule. 
To qualify as a whistleblower under Dodd–Frank, one must 
report misconduct “to the Commission.”250 This mandate is not 
open to more than one interpretation and is exact in its meaning.251 
Thus, the definition unambiguously excludes those who do not 
report to the SEC, and Congress clearly spoke to the issue at hand. 
This is true even when the definition is read in the context of 
subsection (h)(1)(A)(iii). As a result, Asadi’s non-deferential stance 
is the proper legal result to this circuit split. 
C. Policy Considerations: What if the Correct Legal Answer is Bad 
Policy? 
“What makes good law may not make good policy.”252 At the 
outset, it is noteworthy that Asadi does not leave those who report 
internally without recourse in the event of employer retaliation: 
these employees may avail themselves of SOX protections.253 Such 
protections were available to Asadi, but he elected to pursue a 
Dodd–Frank claim instead.254 “The righteous employee might still 
have some recourse.”255 
                                                                                                     
 250. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012). 
 251. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 157 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(Jacobs, J., dissenting) (stating that subsection 21F’s definition of “whistleblower” 
is unambiguous). 
 252. Bernard James & Joanne E. K. Larson, The Doctrine of Deference: 
Shifting Constitutional Presumptions and the Supreme Court’s Restatement of 
Student Rights After Board of Education v. Earls, 56 S.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004). 
 253. These protections, and the processes required to engage and enforce 
them, are found at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). 
 254. See supra notes 123–1132 and accompanying text (demonstrating that 
Asadi could have availed himself of SOX protections instead of Dodd–Frank 
protections). 
 255. Walker, supra note 84, at 1775. 
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This is not to say that pursuing a SOX claim is an attractive 
option. To the contrary, bringing a claim under SOX is a long, 
cumbersome procedure for the claimant. First, the claimant must 
file his or her claim with the Secretary of Labor.256 Then, the 
claimant must wait 180 days for the Secretary to act and, if the 
Secretary does not act, may bring his or her claim to the federal 
courts only after the waiting period.257 If a claim is successful, the 
claimant may obtain relief in the form of reinstatement, back pay 
with interest, and compensation for special damages including 
litigation costs.258 This entire procedure, however, assumes that 
the claimant filed his or her claim with the Secretary of Labor 
within SOX’s miserly statute of limitations, which requires a 
claimant to file a complaint with the Secretary within 180 days of 
their employer’s retaliation.259 
By contrast, Dodd–Frank claimants enjoy a relatively 
streamlined process. There is no administrative exhaustion 
requirement, meaning claimants may bring their complaints 
directly to the courts.260 As previously noted, the potential for 
recovery in most cases is greater than recovery would be under 
SOX due to the availability of reinstatement, litigation costs, and 
two times back pay with interest.261 In addition, the statute of 
limitations is far more generous under Dodd–Frank, which allows 
claimants to bring action up to six years after an alleged violation 
of subsection 21F’s anti-retaliation provisions.262 Finally, Dodd–
                                                                                                     
 256. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 257. See id. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (providing that a claimant may bring his or her 
action before a federal district court in the event the Secretary of Labor does not 
act within 180 days of the claimants filing of the complaint). 
 258. Id. § 1514A(c). 
 259. See id. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (“An action . . . shall be commenced not later 
than 180 days after the date on which the violation occurs, or after the date on 
which the employee became aware of the violation.”). 
 260. See Mark A. Srere & Kristin Robinson, Split Circuits: Second Circuit 
Contradicts the Fifth by Supporting a Broad Interpretation of Dodd–Frank’s 
Anti-Retaliation Provision, BRYAN CAVE (Sept. 11, 2015), 
https://www.bryancave.com/en/thought-leadership/split-circuits-second-circuit-
contradicts-the-fifth-by.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (“Dodd–Frank has . . . no 
administrative exhaustion requirement.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 261. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (outlining the remedies available under 
Dodd–Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions). 
 262. See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (limiting when a whistleblower may bring an 
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Frank whistleblowers enjoy the potential for monetary awards 
from the SEC under subsection 21F’s bounty provisions, which 
authorize the SEC to award between ten and thirty percent of any 
monetary sanction imposed as a result of the whistleblower’s 
reporting to the SEC.263 
It should be plain, even from this cursory overview of SOX and 
Dodd–Frank, which statute is preferable to employer retaliation 
claimants. From the provisions cited above and subsection 21F’s 
definition of “whistleblower,” it appears that Congress’s intention 
was to incentivize reporting misconduct to the SEC.264 In the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis, this would have been a perfectly 
reasonable legislative objective. Indeed, the SEC is not shy or 
introverted with regard to advertising its whistleblower program, 
which the agency actively advertises on its website’s home page.265 
Further, the Office of the Whistleblower’s web page offers the 
latest news detailing bounties awarded under the whistleblower 
program, lists the top ten awards ever paid out to whistleblowers, 
and affords a detailed state-by-state breakdown of tips sent to the 
SEC under the program.266  
There are legitimate concerns, however, that SOX’s 
burdensome requirements, when considered alongside Dodd–
Frank’s generous treatment of whistleblowers, threaten to cause 
employees of public companies to bypass corporate reporting 
                                                                                                     
employer retaliation claim under Dodd–Frank). 
 263. See id. § 78u-6(b) (authorizing the SEC to pay awards to whistleblowers 
whose claims result in monetary sanctions imposed in actions related to their 
whistleblowing activities). 
 264. See The Dodd–Frank Whistleblower Provisions: Considerations for 
Effectively Preparing for and Responding to Whistleblowers, JDSUPRA BUS. 
ADVISOR (May 26, 2011), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-dodd-frank-
whistleblower-provisions-48377/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (“As part of the Dodd–
Frank Act, Congress created powerful incentives to encourage persons to report 
potential violations of the federal securities laws to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 265. The SEC’s website, https://www.sec.gov/index.htm, prominently features 
links to a database of investment professionals, market data and analysis, as well 
as the Office of the Whistleblower website. 
 266. See Whistleblower Awards for Tips Resulting in Enforcement Actions, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/page/whistleblower-
100million (last updated Jan. 23, 2017) (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (displaying, 
prominently, varying types of information and data concerning the SEC’s 
whistleblower program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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systems altogether and preclude intrafirm resolution of potential 
issues.267 Countering these concerns, some commentators have 
posited that, in response to Dodd–Frank, employers should work 
to develop internal reporting systems that shift incentives to offer 
greater benefit to those who report within their respective firms.268 
This is certainly a viable, market-based solution, but it also foists 
costs resulting from Dodd–Frank’s reporting incentives onto the 
private sector.269 
Instead of imposing costs onto the private sector, Congress 
should act to make internal reporting more attractive to private 
sector employees. To be clear, this is not a call to heighten the 
available remedies under SOX or to alter the Dodd–Frank scheme 
in any way. Rather, this Note proposes legislative action which 
removes the administrative exhaustion requirements and extends 
the statute of limitations under SOX’s anti-retaliation provisions. 
As it currently stands, those who wish to report misconduct find 
themselves heavily incentivized to report to the SEC.270 This 
proposed solution attempts to level the scales of choice, such that 
employees may more readily elect to report and resolve corporate 
issues internally. Imposing incentive structures from outside of the 
private sphere could alleviate the costs of realigning reporting 
incentive structures on public companies. Further, removal of the 
exhaustion requirement would return agency to the wrongfully 
terminated, harassed, or otherwise injured employee, who would 
                                                                                                     
 267. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Crucial but (Potentially) Precarious Position 
of the Chief Compliance Officer, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 56, 73 (2013) 
(“[T]he efficacy of internal compliance confronts a greater challenge because 
Dodd–Frank’s anti-retaliation provision protects only individuals who report-out 
to the SEC, whether those individuals are compliance personnel or other 
employees. This appears to create an incentive to bypass internal compliance 
mechanisms altogether . . . .”). 
 268. See Justin Blount & Spencer Markel, The End of the Internal Compliance 
World as We Know It, or an Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law 
Enforcement? Bounty Hunting Under the Dodd–Frank Act’s Whistleblower 
Provisions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1023, 1061 (2012) (“[T]he whistleblower 
provisions of Dodd–Frank have the potential to serve as an incentive for 
companies to more effectively implement and enforce their internal compliance 
programs and attempt to build more ethical cultures.”). 
 269. See Walker, supra note 84, at 1780 (“Instead of relying on a statute or 
agency regulation, companies would take on the initiative, and the cost, of 
providing non-retaliation guarantees themselves.”). 
 270. See supra notes 256–266 (describing the incentive structure resulting 
from the distinctions between SOX and Dodd–Frank). 
WHISTLING LOUD AND CLEAR 559 
no longer need to submit his or her claim to the whim of the 
Secretary of Labor. At the same time, this solution seeks to 
preserve the government’s interest in incentivizing external 
reporting by retaining the heightened remedies available under 
subsection 21F without altering the external reporting 
requirement enshrined by subsection (a)(6). 
This is merely one potential avenue Congress could take to 
resolve the issues arising out of an Asadi-style resolution to the 
circuit split, and it is a vague one at that. Given the time, one could 
write entire volumes detailing potential statutory structures and 
incentive schemes for employees who choose to report misconduct. 
Regardless of the approach taken, it is clear that the solution must 
originate in Congress. The provisions creating our current, 
disparate incentive structure are enshrined by statute,271 and not 
by administrative action or court decision. Thus, only Congress 
holds the power to balance the scales and realign reporting 
incentives by amending those statutes.  Given that the House of 
Representatives recently passed a Dodd–Frank reform—the 
Financial Choice Act—it is not outside the realm of plausibility to 
further amend the securities laws.272 
V. Conclusion 
“[S]ound interpretation requires paying attention to the whole 
law, not homing in on isolated words or even isolated sections. 
Context always matters. Let us not forget, however, why context 
matters: It is a tool for understanding the terms of the law, not an 
excuse for rewriting them.”273 The circuit split discussed here arose 
out of what one appellate court claimed to be a tension arising from 
                                                                                                     
 271. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (providing anti-retaliation protections for 
employees under SOX); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (providing anti-retaliation 
protections for whistleblowers under Dodd–Frank). 
 272. See Geoff Bennett, House Passes Bill Aimed at Reversing Dodd–Frank 
Financial Regulations, NPR (June 8, 2017, 4:54 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2017/06/08/532036374/house-passes-bill-aimed-at-reversing-
dodd-frank-financial-regulations (last visited Nov. 6, 2017) (stating that the 
House of Representatives passed the Financial Choice Act and explaining, in 
general terms, the goals and provisions of that legislation) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 273. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the term “whistleblower” within the context of its surrounding 
provisions.274 The reality, however, reflects a court acting with a 
view to rewriting a plain statutory provision275 to reach what, in that 
court’s view, is a more preferable result.276 
This form of results-oriented jurisprudence belies the judiciary’s 
role of saying what the law is, in favor of saying what the law ought to 
be. The meaning of “whistleblower” under subsection 21F of Dodd–
Frank is clear, as is its application to 21F’s anti-retaliation 
provisions.277 Congress spoke clearly and unambiguously in its 
definition of “whistleblower,” and it is not the courts’ role to subvert the 
express will of Congress.278 That said, it is Congress’s role to rectify any 
problems which may arise from proper application of its statutes, and 
this Note has proposed just one course of action that Congress could 
take to make internal reporting more appealing under SOX; extending 
SOX’s statute of limitations and removing its administrative 
exhaustion requirement.279 If you believe the Asadi approach leads to 
poor policy, blow the whistle loudly enough for Congress to hear it. 
VI. Postscript: Chevron in the Post-Somers Landscape 
On February 21, 2018, nearly one year after this Note was first 
written, the Supreme Court delivered its resolution to Dodd–Frank’s 
whistleblower protection issue.280 The Justices unanimously concurred 
                                                                                                     
 274. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding 
that an arguable ambiguity within subsection 21F is sufficient to grant Chevron 
deference to the SEC’s interpretive rule). 
 275. See id. (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“The majority and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) have altered a federal statute by deleting three 
words (‘to the Commission’) from the definition of ‘whistleblower’ in the Dodd–
Frank Act.”). 
 276. See id. (majority opinion) (declaring the majority’s preference for the 
broader interpretation of subsection 21F endorsed by the SEC’s interpretive rule). 
 277. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(“[T]he perceived conflict between § 78u-6(a)(6) and § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) rests on 
a misreading of the operative provisions of § 78u-6.”). 
 278. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984) (“[T]he court . . . must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.”). 
 279. See infra Part IV.C (proposing a potential course of action Congress could 
take to alleviate concerns surrounding the inefficacy of SOX protections relative 
to those under Dodd–Frank). 
 280. See generally Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, No. 16-1276 (U.S. Feb. 21, 
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with the result of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion that “the statute’s 
definition of ‘whistleblower’ [is] clear and conclusive.”281 Employing 
many of the arguments posited here, and finding no ambiguity in 
Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower protection scheme, the Court refused to 
grant deference to the SEC’s interpretive rule, stating that “the 
statute’s unambiguous whistleblower definition . . . precludes the 
Commission from more expansively interpreting that term.”282 
Strangely, the Court’s opinion lacks any detailed discussion of the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning. Given that the Court unanimously decided 
to reverse the Ninth Circuit, one would think that the Justices would 
take this opportunity to expressly repudiate the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach. Yet, the Court’s opinion contains no discussion of King, the 
“plan” concept, or their place in a Chevron analysis. It would appear 
that the Court found this case straightforward enough to avoid these 
issues altogether. However, without an express rejection of the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis, are we left to presume that King-style arguments 
have some place in Chevron cases? The answer remains unclear, which 
leaves lower courts with the opportunity to further muddy the waters 
of Chevron in the future. 
While the Justices were unanimous in the result, a few members 
of the Court took issue with some of the methods used to reach that 
conclusion. Justice Thomas’s concurrence, with which Justices Alito 
and Gorsuch joined, voices disdain for the Court’s use of legislative 
history—a Senate report, specifically—to bolster its analysis.283 
Justice Thomas plainly argued that courts should not resort to 
pontificating on legislative purpose where, as in Somers, a statute’s 
language is so plain as to clearly express its meaning.284 
                                                                                                     
2018). 
 281. Id. at 18. 
 282. Id. at 19. 
 283. See id. at 1 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Even assuming a majority of 
Congress read the Senate Report, agreed with it, and voted for Dodd–Frank with 
the same intent, ‘we are a government of laws, not of men, and are governed by 
what Congress enacted rather than by what it intended.’” (quoting Lawson v. 
FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1176 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring))). 
 284. See id. at 3 (“And ‘it would be a strange canon of statutory construction 
that would require Congress to state in committee reports . . . that which is 
obvious on the face of a statute.’” (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 
578, 592 (1980))). 
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These textualist notions prompted a second concurrence from 
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Breyer joined. Justice 
Sotomayor summarized her disagreement by stating that: 
I write separately only to note my disagreement with the suggestion 
in my colleague’s concurrence that a Senate Report is not an 
appropriate source for this Court to consider when interpreting a 
statute. 
Legislative history is of course not the law, but that does not mean 
it cannot aid us in our understanding of a law. Just as courts are 
capable of assessing the reliability and utility of evidence generally, 
they are capable of assessing the reliability and utility of legislative-
history materials.285 
After noting the utility of committee reports in the legislative process, 
Justice Sotomayor remarked that legislative history is especially useful 
to courts where a statute is ambiguous.286 Justice Sotomayor went 
further, however, asserting that “even when, as here, a statute’s 
meaning can clearly be discerned from its text, consulting reliable 
legislative history can still be useful, as it enables us to corroborate and 
fortify our understanding of the text.”287  
 It is difficult to envision a serious contention that legislative 
history plays no role at all in a Chevron analysis. As noted above, 
Justice Stevens’s articulation of the test in Chevron is split into two 
distinct questions. The first, “always, is the question whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”288 Congress—or 
its committees and subcommittees, at least—may speak to an issue in 
many ways, including through committee reports. Indeed, committee 
reports “have long been important means of informing the whole 
chamber about proposed legislation . . . .”289 Further, Justice Stevens 
explicitly referred to legislative history in his articulation of Chevron’s 
first step. He  stated   that “‘[i]f [an executive agency’s] choice 
represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that 
were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not 
                                                                                                     
 285. Id. at 1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 286. See id. at 2–3 (“Legislative history can be particularly helpful when a 
statute is ambiguous or deals with especially complex matters.”). 
 287. Id. at 3. 
 288. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 289. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, No. 16-1276, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Feb. 21, 
2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that 
the accommodation is not one that Congress would have 
sanctioned.’”290 Indeed, the Chevron Court itself resorted to legislative 
history as it grappled with divining Congress’s intent with respect to 
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.291 
 Taking all of these considerations into account, there can be no 
doubt that, as Justice Sotomayor argued, legislative history has some 
role to play in Chevron step one. Yet, contrary to Justice Sotomayor’s 
characterization of his concurrence, Justice Thomas did not suggest 
that legislative history has no utility when interpreting a statute. 
Rather, his concurrence expresses “serious doubts” over whether to 
utilize, and, if so, how much weight to afford, legislative history and so-
called congressional purpose in light of plain and unambiguous 
statutory text.292 
 The Court’s decision in Somers is a step in the right direction.  
However, given the Court’s unwillingness to expressly curtail the use 
of King-style analyses in Chevron cases, Justice Thomas’s concerns are 
well-founded. Suppose, for instance, that an agency promulgates a rule 
which, while contradictory to the plain meaning of a statute’s text, 
comports with that statute’s legislative history. What is the proper 
result? In light of King and its “plan” concept, legislative history and 
intent may hold just as much weight, if not more, than unambiguous 
statutory text. The Second and Ninth Circuits’ attempts to supersede 
Dodd–Frank’s plain language failed in Somers, in significant part 
because a Senate Report aligned with and supported the statute’s plain 
text.293 One can only wonder whether the Justices would have reached 
                                                                                                     
 290. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. v. Shimer, 367 
U.S. 374, 382–83 (1961)). 
 291. See id. at 851–54 (referring to a House Report, a Senate Report, and 
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 292. See Somers, slip op. at 1 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (“As the Court observes, this statutory definition ‘resolves the 
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the same result if that Senate Report espoused a conflicting legislative 
purpose. 
